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In the Supreme Court 
of ihe State of Utah 
"\YILLL .. \:Jl G. CARYER, doing busi-
ness as CARYER SHEET :METAL 
"\YORKS, 
Plailntiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
"\Y. T. DENN, doing business as HUB-
BARD DENN JEWELERS, 
Defen-dant and Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CAsE No. 
7374 
This statement of facts will be much the same as 
that set forth by appellant in his brief. However, there 
are certain variations so a re"'statement of the facts 
will probably meet the conditions herein presented. 
Sometime prior to June 7, 1947, one Fred Dunn, 
an employee of the respondent, suggested to George 
Maycock that Mr. W. T. Denn, of the firm of Hubbard-
Denn, was interested in a cooling system. It appeared 
that Dunn had known that Maycock was in the business 
of installing coolers of one kind and another and asked 
Maycock if he would consult 1\t[r. Denn about it. 
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Thereafter Maycock came into Denn 's place of busi-
ness and the two of the1n did discuss the need of a cool-
ing system for the Hubbard-Denn Jewelers at 221 Main 
Ntreet in Salt Lake City, on at least two or three occa-
sions. Denn was entirely without any information or 
learninr; about the cooling business, nor did he know 
anything about how air conditioners worked and so in-
formed Mr. Maycock. Maycock had represented himself 
as an engineer with particular reference to the air con-
ditioning business. 
The proposed cooling system was discussed at least 
on one other occasion, but at no time was any mention 
made of any type of cooler, Denn placing himself and 
his needs entirely in the hands of Maycock. It was finally 
determined that an air conditioner should be installed 
but at no time during the conversations with Mr. May-
cock was there any mention made of any type of air con-
ditioner nor does any of the evidence even suggest such 
a thing. 
It was finally determined that the store should be 
air conditioned and thereafter Mr. George Maycock 
brought one Jack Goaslind into the Hubbard-Denn store 
and told Mr. Denn that the Carver Sheet Metal Works 
would do the installing of the equipment. Goaslind made 
certain measurements about the place and proceeded 
to install what now appears to have been a Palmer 
Evaporative Air Conditioner. Denn didn't know Goas-
lind and apparently had never seen him before Maycock 
brought him in. Denn believed that Goaslind was doing 
the installing for Maycock until a certain letter dated 
June 7, 1947, was delivered to him wherein William G. 
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CarYN'. doing- business as the CarYer Sheet _Metal \York~, 
ag-reed to furnish and install a 1500-H Palmer Evapora-
tiYe :\ir Conditioner with all neressary fittings and grill 
for the sum of $870.00, which included electrical and 
necessary plumbing work. 
The faet that it was a Palmer or any other type of 
machine meant nothing to l\Ir. Denn because he had 
absolutely no information about such machines and he 
had placed his entire reliance upon Maycock. 
The machine was supposed to make no more noise 
than an electric fan, but after it was installed, the noise 
was so great that they were obliged to turn it off. Later 
Goaslind came back and insisted that they could make 
the machine operate satisfactorily, but after several 
attempts the machine does not operate satisfactorily, 
it does not cool the .store; it is noisy, carries dust into 
the store, which hampers the watchmakers in their work, 
and in all respects is an unsatisfactory operation. 
It develops that after Maycock had succeeded In 
selling Denn a cooling system, the name of which was 
never mentioned, he then supplied the equipment to the 
appellant herein, and from that time on it was the appel-
lant who did all the work and now seeks to be paid for 
the equipment and its installation. Maycock disappeared 
from the transaction and admits under oath, as appel-
lant's witness, that there is no obligation financially or 
otherwise to him from respondent in this action. 
It appears from the record affirmatively and with-
out dispute that neither Denn nor Dunn, his employe,e, 
had ever heard of the Palmer Evaporative Air Condi-
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tioner, and that the name thereof meant absolutely 
nothing to them, and it likewise appears from the testi-
Inony of George Maycock that the only thing that ever 
was talked about was ju.st the function of the machine. 
With respect to the cooling service which the 
machine rendered, Mr. Dunn testifies that he placed a 
thermometer which was so used all summer in the front 
of the store and they got 98°, and the thermometer 
showed that at the same time it was 94° in the office; 
that in the front portion of the store, the cooler made 
no material difference in the heat; that when the machine 
was working it made a tremendous humming noise so 
that cu.stomers and clerks alike were obliged to raise 
their voices in order to be heard; that the machine dis-
turbed customers when it was running and in order to 
do business in the store, the machine had to be shut off; 
that in the place where the watchmakers worked, when 
the machine was running, a film of dust was drawn in 
from the outside and laid on the watchmakers' benches 
so that good watchmaking could not be done; and that in 
addition to that when the machine was working, the 
watchmaking room wa.s so hot that it was very uncom-
fortable for the people working there. This evidence is 
entirely undisputed. 
Another objectionable feature was the odor, which 
was described by the witness Dunn as like old wet gunny 
sacks, was noticeable always when the machine operated. 
However, in spite of all this both Mr. Dunn and Mr. 
Denn stated that if a machine could be made to work, 
they wanted a cooler in the store but they wanted one 
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that would giYe then1 n1ore cooling in the store than 98° 
front and ~14° in the back end. 
ARGUMENT 
..:\..ppellant has stated that the only question to be 
deter1nined in this appeal is the proper application of 
Section 81-1-15 Utah Code Annotated 1943, and par-
ticularly subdivisions ( 1) and ( 4) of this Section, to the 
facts. which subdivision3 read as follows : 
(1) "\Vhere the buyer expressly or by impli-
cation, makes known to the seller the particular 
purpose for which the goods are required, and 
it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's 
skill or judgment (whether he is the grower or 
manufacturer or not), there is an implied war-
ranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for 
ouch purpose. 
( 4) In the case of a contract to sell or a 
sale of a specified article under its patent or other 
trade name, there is no implied warranty as to 
its fitness for any particular purpose. 
and he asks the question, "Can an installer who is 
neither the dealer nor the manufacturer of an article 
which is described by its patent or trade name be charged 
with an implied warranty of quality, particularly where 
there io a complete absence of any evidence of reliance 
by the buyer upon the installer~'' 
Respondent might have some little agreement with 
the first part of the above declaration, but believes that 
the evidence which has been introduced in this case 
thoroughly justifies the implied warranty of quality 
which the trial court found was there. 
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Referring to one of plaintiff's witnesses, George 
:Maycock, appellant states that this witness testified that 
he was asked by Fred Dunn to come to defendant's place 
of business to discuss the installation of a cooling device; 
that he did so and after several meetings with the de-
fendant, W. T. Denn, and with Fred Dunn, they decided 
upon the installation of a Palmer Evaporative Air Con-
ditioner. Counsel has drawn largely on his imagination 
for this idea because the record will be searched in vain 
for any such evidence. Now here in the testimony of Mr. 
~f a~Tcock nor in the testimony of any other witness is 
there any statement that Dunn or anybody ·else ever 
decided upon the installation of a Palmer Air Condi-
tioner. As a matter of fact, the first time that respondent 
or anybody in their employ appear to have ever had 
the slightest information that a Palmer Evaporative Air 
Conditioner was the type to be installed is found in the 
letter, defendant's Exhibit 1, which was delivered to 
Mr. Denn by Carver himself after Goaslind had been 
taken to Denn's place of business by Maycock (Tr. 103), 
and it is singularly significant that in no place in the 
testimony introduced is there any recommendation about 
the quality of the Palmer Air Conditioner, and if we 
may draw a conclusion from the testimony of Mr. May-
cock as found on page 38 of the reporter's transcript, or 
page 68 of the record, it will be noticed that Maycock 
seemed not now to represent the Palmer company, which 
would indicate that even the Maycock people are not 
sold upon that type of cooler. 
An analysis of the circumstances which lead up to 
this litigation may be helpful here. The respondent was 
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desirous of installing a cooler of some type and it must 
be adinitted that the eYidenee preponderantly bears out 
the fact that ~Lr. Denn nor none of hi:-; associates knew 
anything about cooling sy.sten1s. .An expert in the line 
and one who had had dealings with this type of service 
was contactel1. He made several visits to respondent at 
his place of business and finally it was decided that a 
cooler would be installed. There is absolutely no evi-
dence, as we have indicated above, as to the type of 
cooler at that time, nor L~ there a single word of testi-
mony which would indicate that the name Palmer Evap-
orative Air Conditioner was ever used. 
It appears that the negotiations covered between 
two and four weeks (Tr. 70). Maycock indicated to 
Denn that a fair degree of cooling could be secured from 
the cooling system and that there would not be a great 
deal of noise in its operation (Tr. 72). It was decided 
as undesirable to place the mechanism outside the build-
ing in the alley. There is a dispute in the testimony as 
to whether the installation was to be made by a con-
tractor or if Denn would do the installing himself, or 
that the Carver Sheet Metal Works should make the in-
stallation. Maycock took Jack Goaslind of the Carver 
Sheet Metal Works to talk with Denn with relation to 
the installation and he, Maycock, declares that beyond 
that he knows nothing about the installation itself. He 
does admit, however, that he showed Goaslind where 
the installation was to be and he had seen the installa-
tion after it was complete. He admits that there was 
too much noise and there was an accumulation of con-
densation on the ceiling which caused water to drop; 
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that a new Inotor was installed and that other changes 
were n1ade in the installation, and finally a peripheral 
lining was placed around the cabinet work. 
:Maycock had been in the evaporative air conditioner 
jnstallation business for twelve years. He testified that 
as to dust or dirt on the affluent, the outside air side, it 
should be practically eliminated; but on the inside you 
can't do a thing about it. There is nothing that can be 
provided to eliminate the amount of dust or odor or 
anything of that sort which might be in the air as it 
comes into the conditioning unit. 
Maycock was the engineer who was in charge of this-
installation and admitted that there was noise when the 
machine was running. Maycock admitted that the store 
was very warm and that he had seen the thermometer 
and as he re1nembered it was 84°. He admitted that it 
1night have been higher; testified that it didn't make 
any difference to Denn what the machine was, whether 
it was a Smith or Palmer, or any other machine; that 
he didn't elaborate on the quality of the machine, just 
its function. It was Maycock who wrote the letter for 
the Carver people, defendant's Exhibit 1 (Tr. 109). 
Denn testified that he didn't know Goaslind until 
Maycock brought him in and was of the opinion that 
Goaslind was doing the installing for Maycock. In fact, 
he knew no different until the letter of June 7, 1947 was 
delivered to him. Denn, of course, knew absolutely noth-
ing about where such a machine should be installed, nor 
how, nor any of the details, and had to rely, aa indeed 
he did, entirely upon the people furnishing and installing 
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the 1nachine. There was a bit of smooth maneuvering 
on the part of :Jir. :JLayroek. He attempts to avoid re-
~ponsibility and, so far as ~Ir. Denn is concerned, suc-
ceeded because he sold the equipment to the Carver peo-
ple who agreed to furnish and install it, Exhibit l, and 
:JI.ayrork declares that respondent owes him nothing. 
\Yh~~, "~e wonder, did :\raycock dodge this issue! 
The plaintiff knew that they were installing a cool-
ing ~~~stein in a jewelry store. He knew it was required 
to cool the store. He lmew too that the Inachine should 
not di::;turb customers. He knew that if it threw water 
all over the ceiling and made it appear to be raining in 
the building, that the machine wasn't working properly. 
He knew that in a jewelry store watches are repaired; 
that dirt on a watchmaker's bench would be just about 
as appropriate as kerosene on a baker's molding board. 
He knew too that neither Denn nor anybody in the jew-
elry store knew anything about cooling systems. At 
least this latter is a reasonable presumption from the 
testimony "which has been introduced. 
Now, what did the machine do~ Beginning at the 
end of the room in which it was installed, we find that 
it threw dust in on the work benches of the watchmakers 
to such an extent that it had to he shut off. Also, that 
very room which up to the time the cooler was installed 
was reasonably comfortable in the summer time, when 
the machine was running the room was unbearably hot 
(Tr. 65). The machine when first installed threw off 
so much water that the water actually dripped from the 
ceiling. That, however, was corrected to a certain extent. 
The noise of the machine when it was operating after 
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the last correction.s were made is so great that people 
working in the store in dealing with customers have to 
raise their voices to a place where it is uncomfortable 
for everybody. The machine is distracting to customers 
and makes the doing of business hard, to say the least. 
The machine does not cool the store, particularly the 
front or we.st end where the customers come in. A ther-
mmneter was installed and was kept there throughout 
the entire summer. In the afternoons the temperature 
in the store went up to 98° in the front and back in the 
office it was cooled down to 94°, all of which can be seen 
as unbearably hot. A cooling machine that did not cool 
the front of the store below 98° would be absolutely use-
less to the respondent. 
Appellant made various efforts to adjust the diffi-
culties but there never wa.s a time when the machine 
would work so that the customers were not disturbed; 
when dust was not brought into the watchmakers' 
benches ; when the front end of the store was not exceed-
ingly hot; when the watchmakers' room was not so hot 
that the men could hardly work in it, and all in all the 
machine was an ab.solute failure and after repeated 
efforts on the part of the people who installed it, no 
change was brought about in the conditions, and there-
upon a recision of the contract was declared and Carver 
notified to take out the machine. It seems that no other 
conclusion can be reached than that this machine failed 
to do and perform the offices for which it was purchased. 
The section of the statute above set forth provides 
'that there is no implied warranty of quality or fitne.ss for 
any particular purpose under a contract to sell except 
10 
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where the buyer absolutely or by implication makes 
know~n to the seller the particular purpose for which the 
good::; were required and the buyer looks to the seller's 
skill to ::;upply that need. Certainly in this rase the buyer 
indicated clearly what his need was and it is admitted 
that the buyer h.11ew nothing about that type of equip-
ment. Granting that appellant was not in on all the pre-
liminary ronver.sations, the fact remains that he was in 
the business of furnishing and installing such equip-
ment. He kne"- it was a cooler and he knew what a cooler 
was supposed to do, and while there is no privity of 
contract at all between Denn and Maycock, there certain-
ly may be such a responsibility between Carver and 
:Maycock that Carver can be relieved of any damage 
he may sustain as the result of the failure of this equip-
ment in defendant' .s store, but the respondent has noth-
ing to do nor is he concerned with this. 
Appellant has cited the case of Landes and Com-
pany v. Fallows, 81 Utah 432, 10 Pacific (2d) 389. This 
case dealt with the purchase price of a harvester for 
which the suit was brought. The defendant pleaded a 
breach of implied warranty but the court found against 
the defendant upon the theory that the contract pro-
vided against such a warranty. 
Battle Creek Bread Wrapping Machine Company v. 
Paramount Baking Company, 88 Utah 67, 39 Pacific (2d) 
323, is also cited. In this case the court found: 
''The fact that an article ha.s a trade name 
does not negative an implied warranty of fitness 
for a particular purpose where it is purchased 
not by name but for a particular purpose and sup-
plied for that purpose." 
11 
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In the case at bar a cooling system was ordered for 
a particular purpose and it was installed and it did not 
deliver the service for which it was sold, and the courto 
have held that the buyer of a machine may under the 
co1nmon law or the uniform sales act rely upon an im-
plied warranty of fitness for the purpose indicated where 
he made known to the manufacturer and the seller the 
purpose for which the machine was desired, and trusts 
to the latter's skill and judgment to furnish a machine 
suitable for the purpose. 
Dunn Road Machine Company v. Charlevoix A. & 
Engineering Company, 247 Michigan 398, 225 North-
western 592, 64 ALR 947. J. L. Owens Company v. 
Leland Farmer Elevator Company, 192 Iowa 771, 185 
Northwestern 590. 
Universal Motor Company v. Snow, 149 Virginia 
690, 140 Southeastern 653, 59 ALR 117 4. 
In this case the motor company through its sales-
man sold to the defendant a mill to be substituted for a 
burrmill then in use by the defendant. The mill was 
installed and the defendant made a cash payment and 
gave two notes for the balance. The first note was paid 
but when the defendant refused to pay the second note, 
an action was brought to enforce its payment and the 
defendant by answer claimed a breach of warranty 
attending the sale because he said the mill wouldn't do 
what it was supposed to do. In 'this case a small model 
mill was exhibited to the defendant. In the case at bar 
no such proof ·exists. However, the mill would not do 
what it was represented it would do, and the court found 
12 
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that there was an in1plied warranty in favor of the de-
fendant and found again8t the plaintiff and this finding 
was affir1ned by the court of last resort. In the course 
of that opinion the court approved the doctrine in Linen 
Thread Cmnpany v. Shaw, 9th Fed. (2d) 17, wherein the 
court said: 
''Regardless of the statutes of l\lassachu-
.sett8, there is under the common law an in1plied 
warranty that articles supplied by a manufacturer 
or a dealer shall be reasonably fit for the purpose 
for which he knew they were intended provided 
the purchaser relies on his skill and knowledge.'' 
In Jones v. Just, 23 English Ruling Cases 466, the 
rules of implied warranty are classified and approved 
and under ~mbdivision 4 of such classification is the 
following: 
"Where a manufacturer or dealer contracts 
to sell an article which he manufactures or pro-
duces, or in which he deals, to be applied to a 
particular purpose so that the buyer necessarily 
trusts to the judgment or skill of the Inanufac-
turer or dealer, there is in that case an in1plied 
term of warranty that the article will be reason-
ably fit for the purpose to which it was to be 
applied.'' 
In Bristol Tramways and Carriage Company v. 
Fiat Motors, K.B. 831, it is held: 
''Where the 1Juyer of certain omnibuses in-
formed the seller they were required for a certain 
character of traffic, this statement was held suffi-
cient to show that the buyer relied upon the sell-
er's skill or judgment without any further evi-
dence on the point, and that, being so, there was 
13 
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an implied condition that the omnibuses would be 
reasonably fit for the declar·ed purpose.'' 
See al.:;o Ireland v. Lewis K. Liggett Company, 243 
Massachusetts 243, 137 Northeastern 371. 
Counsel cites Iron Fireman Coal Stoker Company 
v. Brown, 182 Minnesota 399, 234 Northwestern 685 and 
quotes at length from the opinion. He stops his quoting 
where the language does him the most good; however, 
he should have continued because the opinion goes on 
after citing cases to say: 
''Such cases as Aetna Chemical Company v. 
Spaulding and Kimball Company, '98 Vermont 
51, 126 Atlantic 582; Remsberg v. Hackney Manu-
facturing Company, 174 California 799, 164 Pa-
cific 792; and Empire Cream Separator Company 
v. Quinn, 184 Appellant Division 302, 171 New 
York Supplement 413, seem to be grounded on the 
thought ·that the purchaser knew what he was 
ordering and is inferentially credited with having 
made the selection : ' ' 
The court then goes on to say: 
''This provision of the statute is merely a 
restatement of the common law rule where it ia 
a sale of the known, described and defined article, 
and if that article is in fact supplied there is no 
implied warranty but· we think the rule at com-
mon law and now under such a statute means 
articles known in the market and among those 
familiar with that kind of trade by description.'' 
Citing cases, and then : 
"In this case it would seem that the Iron 
Fir.eman .wasn't known to defendants. They were 
entirely Ignorant aa to its ability or capacity to 
14 
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work or the work which it would do. Plaintiff 
was in possession of all these facts. Defendants 
did not even know it had a tnHle nan1e. It then 
had a lin1ited use in their community * * * They 
had no knowledge of the Iron ~--,ireman by repu-
tation or otherwise. They made their desires 
known to plaintiff * * * Defendants unsuccess-
fully atten1pted to n1ake it work. Plaintiff knew 
defendants had no knowledge of the equipment 
or its operation. Defendants' reliance on plain-
tiff'~ judgment as to the suitability of the equip-
ment to meet their requirements is evident from 
all the circumstances * * * The fact that the 
article had a trade name does not do away with 
the implied warranty arising out of the circum-
stances indicated.'' Citing cases. 
In this case it is also found that where a buyer 
ignorant of his own requirements informs the seller of 
his particular need.::; and the seller undertakes to select 
and supply an article suitable for the purpos·e involved, 
subdivision (1) and not subdivision (4), G. S. 1923 (Sec-
tion 8390) applies even though the article may be de-
scribed in the contract of sale by its trade name. 
In Bagley v. International Harvester Company, 206 
Pacific Reporter ( 2d) 43, the court says: 
"The major question in determining the ex-
istence of an implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpo.::;e is the reliance by the buyer 
upon the skill and judgment of the seller to select 
an article suitable for his needs and the question 
as to whether the article was described by its 
trade name or trademark is not conclusive if the 
other conditions exist which would raise an rm-
plied warranty of its character." 
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Pierce v. Crowl, 190 Pacific (2d) 1003. This was 
an action brought by plaintiff againat the defendants 
for recovery of damage because defendants used a de-
fective material which caused the hous·e of plaintiff to 
give off moisture both on the inside and outside and 
plaintiff was damaged by the sweating of his house. 
There was a defense interposed but the court held: 
''Where an article of personal property is 
sold for a definite purpose made known to the 
·aeller and the seller repr·esents that the article 
will perform that particular purpose, there is a 
warranty of fitness which protects the purchaser 
and for which the seller is liable in the event the 
article fails to do what it was sold to do." Citing 
cases. 
In Greenland Development Company v. Allied Heat-
ing Products Company, 184 Virginia 588, 35 Southeast-
ern (2d) 801, 164 ALR 1312, the court reiterates the 
doctrine that when one contracts to supply an article in 
which he deals to he applied to a particular purpose so 
that the buyer necesaarily trusts to the judgment or skill 
of the vendor, there is an implied warranty that it shall 
be reasonably fit for the purpose to which it is to be 
applied, and the better doctrine is that the rule applies 
to dealers as well as manufacturers, and this court also 
declares that where the purchaaer does not designate any 
specific article but orders a particular quality for a 
particular purpose and the seller knows of this purpose, 
the presumption is that the purchaser relies upon the 
judgment of the seller and the seller by undertaking to 
furnish the goods impliedly undertakes that they shall 
be reasonably fit for the purpoae for which they are 
intended. 
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~-\.ppellant 1uakes 11mch, or attenlph; to make much, 
of the fact that this cooling system was described by its 
patent or tradp name and cites several cases in support 
of the fact that there can be no implied warranty that an 
article "-ould suit the particular needs of the buyer where 
it is ~elected by its trade name or trademark even though 
the buyer had communicated to the seller his particular 
use for or the need for the article, or the seller had 
other"-ise obtained information in this regard. It is sub-
mitted that so far as the case at bar is concerned, these 
case:-; have no application and they are clearly distin-
guishable because in the case at bar the respondent had 
absolutely nothing to do with the selection of the article 
and the fact that it had a name meant simply nothing to 
respondent. He didn't see the article before it was in-
stalled; he knew nothing about the distinction or the 
good and bad qualities of competing equipment. As a 
matter of fact, he had never heard of the Palmer Evap-
orative Air Conditioner before he saw the name written 
in the offer of appellant to install it, and he was abso-
lutely without any knowledge as to what it would do or 
how it would do it, and he relied entirely upon the people 
selling him the equipment and installing it that it would 
produce the desired effect. 
Not only that, but there is no evidence of any kind 
that the name of the cooler installed is a trade name 
or that there are patents affecting it. Nor is there the 
slightest indication of any kind which would even impute 
knowledge about the machine or its possible workings to 
respondent. Appellant knew all about it and the undis-
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puted evidence here indicates preponderantly that re-
~pondent relied on appellant fully. 
The fact that appellant determined to take over 
where ~\Iaycock left off is not the responsibility of the 
respondent, and the fact that appellant was willing to 
take a chance on the equipment which he did install is 
likewise not any responsibility of the Hubbard-Denn 
.Jewelers. But appellant took on the responsibility of 
installing a cooler in the store of Hubbard-Denn Jewel-
ers which would cool the place and which would not be 
noisy nor dusty nor discommode customers and for a 
certain price. The machine failed to do all the things for 
which it was wanted and for which respondent relied 
upon appellant. 
It is, therefore, insisted that there was an implied 
warranty of fitness that it would do all the things which 
respondent requir,ed to be done, and having failed to do 
so, as is shown by a preponderance of the evidence in 
this case, the judgment of the trial court was right and 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAN B. SHIELDS, 
Attorney for Res,pondent 
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